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In early December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. He promised an end to decades of conflict in the turbulent eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy exemplifies the core principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—despite the fact that this fits with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative echoed this, commenting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This shift is major, but experts warn it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Tensions

In contrast to his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant feud has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Selective Involvement

An analogous confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Some analysts describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.